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l 
In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
I STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff - Respondent, 
- vs. -
ROBERT LEE DIXON, 
Defendant - Appellant. 
Case No. 
10905 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Robert Lee Dixon, appeals from 
a conviction by jury trial for the crime of grand 
larceny. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant was convicted on jury trial for 
'he charged offense of grand larceny. 
HEUEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction in 
lower court or, in the alternative, a new trial. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, State of Utah, agrees with the state- , 
ment of facts as contained in the brief of the appei. 
lant, with the following additional facts and exrn
0 
tions. ' 
Two to three minutes prior to the occurrencs· 
of the incident in question, the assistant manager 
of the store, Mr. Thomas Woodside, observed a stack 
of $20 bills in the cash register in question (R. 19-20). 
Mr. Woodside testified that immediately after the 
incident, he closed off the register (R. 39, 68). After 
apprehending the defendant, he made a preliminary 
determination as to the amount of money that was 
missing from the cash register and was able to de-
termine that 3.11 of the $20 bills were missing (R. 261. 
Mr. Woodside also testified on cross-examination 
that it was dark at the time of the chase (R. 30). 
Mr. Dennis H. Richardson, assistant store man-
ager, testified that he made a search of the area tha1 1 
same evening the incident occurred in an effort to 
find the money, but found nothing because it was 
dark (R. 75). The next morning a number of $20 bills 
were found by Mr. Richardson in a weed patch (R 
78). Mr. Richardson testified that when he first count· 
ed the money, he thought there was $180. Two days 
later, Mr. Richardson obtained the money from the 
safe and handed it to Mr. Woodside (R. 24), who in ' 
tum gave ten $20 bills to Officer Larry J. Sturdevart ' 





THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMIT-
TING INTO EVIDENCE CURRENCY OFFERED BY 
THE PROSECUTION AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. 
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the 
:idmission of the currency into evidence by the State 
1s controlled by the law, as set out in appellant's brief 
in regard to the chain of possession, respondent sub-
mits that the testimonv produced at the time of trial 
sustains a complete chain of evidence identifying 
the currency from the moment it was found to its 
admission. 
The record discloses that Mr. Dennis H. Richard-
~on found the money (R. 77), placed it in a safe (R. 
78), later handed it to Mr. Thomas Woodside (R. 24), 
\'.rho, in lurn, gave it to Officer Larry Sturdevant (R. 24 
and 92). Officer Sturdevant testified that Exhibit A, 
lhe currency in question, was the ten $20 bills he 
acquired from Thomas Woodside (R. 91-2). 
The appellant in his brief would require the 
prosecution to establish a complete chain of control 
over the evidence and affirmatively establish that 
no others had access to such evidence, without any 
regard as to the ease or difficulty with which the 
Particula.r evidence could have been altered. As to 
thr:i practicalities of proof, it is submitted that the 
prosecution need only establish that it is reasonably 
~ertain that substitution, alteration, or tampering did 
not occur. Eisentrager v. State, 79 Nev. 38, 378 P.2d 
4 
526 (1963); People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 3CJS p 1 , 
(1956), cert. den. 353 U.S. 930, I L.Ed.2d 724, 77 .. 
721, appeal dism. 358 TJ.S 646, 3 L.Ed.2d 568, 79 
537. 
Respondent submits that the type of 
]nvolved in the cases cited by appellant is 
that in the instant case in that alteration of the ev 
dence in this case, if any, does not obliterate._, 
change the condition which is sought to be shcw.,r: 
that is, the amount taken was more than $50 .. · 
The confusion of thjs case rests on the fact 
money, in general, is all alike. Since Mr. Richardso:1 
could not absolutely identify the currency on 
stand, the prosecution attempted to establish ·•· 
chain, showing the possession of the currency 
the moment it was found untll the moment it w0, 
introduced at the time of trial. The exhibit was 
missible so fa.r as identity is concerned when it 
been identified as being the same object abm: · 
which the testimony was being given and wher. - ' 
was stated as beinQ in the same condition as :d 
time of the occurrence 1n questlon. State v. Lee, 
Ariz. 213, 295 P.2d 380 (1956); State v. Price, 7G Ari: 
385, 265 P.2d 444 (l_ 954): State v. Weis, 92 Anz. · 
375 P.2d 735 (1962). See generally 2 Wharton Crim-
inal Evidence,§ 675 (12th ed. 1955). 
The type of evidence involved in the cise -
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. Chugg, 13 
399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957)
1 
and Clayton v. Metropolitan! 
Life Insurance Co" 96 Utah 331, 85 P.2d 819 (I 1 





·· rhi)Jn of possessjon shows 1t is as likely as net 
+ The evidence analyzed was not the evidence 
ncr:n.11y received. See People v. Riser, supra, and 
'"IS"'3 rxJllected m 21 A.L.R.2d 1216 (1952). 
It 1s the further contention of respondent that 
tlie currency admitted into evidence merely supple-
,,1entcd the testimony of the witnesses. The admis-
s1nn o± the currency into evidence is not necessary, 
smce the evidence without the admission of the cur-
rency was sufficient to sustain a conviction. State 
v. Campbell. 116 Utah 74, 208 P.2d 530 (1949). In that 
case, this court stated: 
"Tf the expert's opinion was founded upon false 
premises-the wrong articles, 0r defective articles-
that is a matter of cross examination, and of de-
fense. The prosecution proved generally the con-
dition of articles by their valuations; the defense 
has the burden of tearing down that testimony by 
croBs-examination or by demanding the production 
of the articles and introducing them if their pre-
sentation would refute the values advanced by the 
p'.1)secutinn. If the condition of clothes or of other 
articles is to be shown in a case, it is not absolutely 
necessary that they be produced in court; they may 
be described." 
( 116 Utah at 80) 
Se'e also State v. Hall, 105 Utah 151, 139 P.2d 
( 1943). reversed on other grounds, 105 Utah 162, 
1JS P.2.d 494 (1944); Spittorff v. State, 108 Ind. 171, 
:~ n r. CJ t J 0 886) 
6 
It has been held in a number of Utah cases 
testimony of one acquainted with the value of lhf' 
stolen property is sufficient to make out a value 0~ 
over $50 for purposes of grand larceny. State v. 
Little. 5 U.2d 42, 296 P.2d 289 (1956); State v. Myer~. 
5 U.2d 365, 302 P.2d 276 (1956); State v. Vigil, 12: 
Utah 495. 260 P.2d 539 (1953); and State v. Campbell, 
supra. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT, THAT THE COURT 
ERRED IN FAILING TO PROHIBIT THE STATE'S 
ATTORNEY FROM ARGUING FLIGHT BY DEFEND-
ANT IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT, IS NOT SUPPORT-
ED BY THE RECORD. 
The record does not support the conclusion thar , 
the lower court denied appellant's requests prohibit- 1 
ing counsel for the State from arguing the inference 
of flight by the defendant or the fact that counsel 
for the State even argued such inference before thP 
jury. 
State v. Hanna. 81 Utah 583, 21 P.2d 537 (1933i 1 
on which appellant relies is distinguished from the 
instant case in that although argument of couns~ 
were not recorded, the objection to the arc.1'L1mrn 1 
and subsequent discussions were part of the tnr 
1 
script. 






: 11 v- by counsel are not preserved in the record, 
cowt in Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 Utah 543, 
136 P2d 968 (1948), stated: 
"Since the arguments of counsel were not preserved 
in the record, we are hardly in a position to say 
that the argument of plaintiff's counsel to the jury 
wns improper, and grounds for reversal. Error will 
not be µresumed, nor can we presume misconduct 
on the part of counsel. ... There is nothing in the 
record before us on which this court could hold coun-
sel guilty of improper conduct." (113 Utah at 558) 
This court was held in a criminal case that 
v.rhere aryuments of counsel to jury were not pre-
s,2i:ved in the record, a reversal could not be predi-
011 the ground that the prosecuting attorney 
.~. F,rou_rn>=int to the jury made improper and prejudi-
~:ol stataments. State v. Cooper, 114 Utah 531, 201 
This court has held in a criminal case that 
P 764 (l 949). See also 4 Am. J ur.2d, Appeal and 
Error, s 541 (1962), and Annotation 67 A.L.R.2d 297, 
' 13 (] 959). 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court did not err in admitting into 
"''' ·knee c1 urency at the time of trial because the 
'rd disc102.es n. complete chain of possession and 
identification. 
Th2 record does not disclose any prejudicial 
· 11 1 ·1fYlmitt·?d by the court. 
8 
Respondent 11rges, therefore, that 1-he 
:::if th·-:: =ip~)elL""nt be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitrrd. 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
TOM G. PLATIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
